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1. INTRODUCTION
There are two types of commonly used cryptosystems in 
cryptography7: Symmetric key and public key cryptosystems. In 
symmetric key cryptosystem, a secret key should be distributed 
in a secure manner between the sender and the receiver with the 
help of trusted key distribution center (KDC) whereas in public 
key cryptosystem the sender and the receiver have different keys 
which are called public key and private key. Key distribution is 
the main problem in symmetric key cryptosystem. To overcome 
the problem, public key cryptosystem was developed. But 
there is a possibility that an intruder can modify the public key 
of the authorised user in public key cryptosystem. It leads to 
key authentication problem. 
HY-scheme was proposed by Horng and Yang6 tried to 
address the key authentication problem. The server plays an 
important role in the HY-scheme. In the scheme the certificate 
is generated by each user using the combination of password 
from the server and his/her private key. But according to 
Zhanetal.5 the HY-scheme was prone to the password guessing 
attack. So he proposed ZLYH-scheme in which the problem 
was addressed. The scheme succeeded in avoiding the guessing 
attack, but failed to achieve non-repudiation. 
Lee4, et al. proposed a new key authentication scheme 
called LHL-scheme to achieve non-repudiation and succeeded 
in doing so. But Peinado2 pointed out two security problems in 
the LHL-scheme. The first problem is the recovery of user’s 
private key from his/her certificate and other public values. The 
second problem is the certificate verification process is done 
independently without involvement of certificate, for a given 
public key. So he improved the LHL-scheme using access 
control equation for public key verification without generating 
the certificate. Later, the LHL-scheme was modified by Zhang 
and Kim3 who individually performed cryptanalysis of the 
scheme. The important aspects of the modified LHL-scheme 
are that it prevents guessing attack, achieves non-repudiation 
and makes calculating private key from certificate and other 
public parameters very difficult. 
Considering all the above mentioned schemes, Shao1 
proposed a new key authentication scheme which addresses 
the problems of earlier schemes. 
However, Shao scheme suffers from two security problems. 
The first one is that it depends on key server as a trusted third 
party which is not secure when the server is compromised. The 
second one is that the users’ passwords are available in plaintext 
form in the server is not preferable according to Purdy8. To 
overcome the drawbacks of Shao scheme and earlier schemes, 
we propose an improved key authentication scheme.   
 
2. AN IMPROVED KEY AUTHENTICATION 
SCHEME
Every user is allowed to choose a unique identity called 
user id (ID) and a password (PWD) to login in to the system. In 
general the system keeps a password table in a key server for all 
the authentic users and uses the key server as an authority. The 
password table stores each user’s hashed password, f (PWD), 
where PWD is the password of the user and f is a one-way 
function. Hence, the server cannot derive and know the PWD 
of the user. This proposal consists of three phases: Setup phase, 
registration phase and authentication phase and are described 
below: 
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2.1  Setup Phase
In this phase, the key server initialises the following 
public parameters.
(i) p, where p is a large prime number
(ii) q, where q is a large prime divisor of p-1
(iii) g, where g is a generator of order q in the Galois Field, 
GF(p). 
(iv) f is a one way function defined as 
f (x) = gx mod p                                                       (1)
2.2 Registration Phase 
In this phase, the initialised parameters are considered for 
registration of every user. For registration, every user has to 
compute his/her public key and certificate. 
First, to compute the public key (Pub) every user selects 
his/her private key (Prv) and applies function f on private key 
as follows.
Pub = f (Prv) =   g Prv mod p           (2)
Next, the certificate of the user is generated with the help 
of the following three steps.
 Step1: In this step, set of new parameters are computed by the 
user as shown below.
(i) Choose a random number r in Zq*.
(ii)  Compute S, R and T values using the parameters PWD, r 
and f as follows:
 (a)  S = f (PWD + r)                                 (3)
 (b)  R = f (r)                                                        (4) 
  (c)  T = f (PWD * r)                                                       (5) 
(iii) Select two random numbers v1 and v2 in Zq
*, which are co-
prime 
(iv) Apply the Chinese remainder theorem to compute a value 
X 
 X ≡ Prv (mod v1)                                                            (6)  X ≡ (PWD * r) (mod v2)                                                 (7) 
The value X is unique in the modulo of v1* v2. Select the 
minimum positive value of X out of all possible values of X.
(v) Once again select k1 and k2 values to satisfy the following 
two equations
X = Prv + k1 * v1            (8)
X = (PWD * r) + k2 * v2                                        (9)
(vi) Finally compute two more parameters α and β as follows
1  mod  vg pα =                                                              (10)
2   mod  vg pβ =                                                              (11)
The step1 computes the values of S, R, T, X, α, β, k1 and 
k2, and then the user sends his/her ID, Pub and all these values 
except X to the server for registration. All these values are 
encrypted with the public key of the key server to prevent the 
attackers from impersonation.
Step2: The key server verifies the received parameters  S, 
R, T, α, β, k1 and k2 with the following access control equations, 
Eqn. (12) and Eqn. (13). The generation of Eqns.(12), (13), and 
(15) is clearly explained in the proof (mentioned below) of our 
proposed theorem.
      ( )*   mod  S f PWD R p=                                     (12)
1 2 *   *   mod  k kPub T pα = β                           (13)
If the values of the received parameters satisfy the above two 
equations, then the key server accepts them. The parameters T, 
α, β, k1, k2, ID and Pub are stored in public password table. The 
remaining parameters S and R are stored in secret password 
table. The parameters X, Prv, PWD are kept as secret values 
with the user. In case, the verification process by the key server 
fails, the parameters of the user are not stored and also the user 
is declared as unauthentic.
Step3: If the verification is successful in step2, then the 
user generates his/her certificate (C) with the parameters PWD, 
r, X, Pub, q, α and β as follows
  C = [α * (PWD * r) + β * X * Pub)] mod q                (14)
Now, each user registers his/her computed public key and 
certificate in public key directory (PKD) as a pair of (C, Pub) 
with his/her user ID. Then the registration process is completed 
successfully. 
2.3  Authentication Phase 
In this phase, if a user (sender) wants to communicate 
with the other user (receiver), he/she (sender) has to verify the 
ID along with C and Pub of the other user (receiver). First, the 
sender obtains the pair (C, Pub) of the receiver along with ID 
from public key directory, accesses all other parameters related 
to the user from public password table stored in the key server 
and verifies using the Eqn. (13) and the following Eqn. (15). 
( ) 2 *      *  [  *  ]  mod  k Pubf C T T pα β = β                (15)
If the above two equations are satisfied, the sender accepts 
the public key of the receiver otherwise, the sender rejects it. 
The trustworthiness of proposed key authentication 
scheme is based on the proposed theorem and its verification. 
Theorem: If the user, the key server and the requester follow 
the proposed scheme, the requester always accepts the public 
key.
Proof: From Eqn. (3) and Eqn. (4), we have 
 S = f (PWD + r)
= gPWD * gr  
 ( )    *   mod  .S f PWD R p∴ =
Also, from Eqn. (5) and Eqns. (8) - (11), we have
( ) 1 1 2 2Pr    *  *      *    mod  mod  v k v PWD r k vf X g p g p+ += =
	 1 1 2 2
Pr     *   * ( )  mod    *  ( ) mod    v v k PWD r v kg g p g g p so=  
	 ( ) 21   *    * mod ,   kkf X pub T p= α = β
moreover, from Eqn. (14) and above conclusion we 
have,
( ) ( )[   *   *     *   *  )]     mod  PWD r X pubf C g pα + β=  
 * (  *  )      *    mod  
PubPWD r Xg g p
α β   =     
( )   *         *       mod  PubT f X pβα =    
 
from Eqn. (5) and Eqn. (1)
( ) 2   *     *  [  *  ]  mod  k Pubf C T T pα β = β   from Eqn. (14)
Hence the Eqns. (12), (13), and (15) are proved.
 
3.  SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
3.1 Security Analysis
It verifies whether the fundamental services; 
confidentiality, authentication, non-repudiation and security 
of the public key, are provided and prove that our proposed 
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scheme is a secured one. The above services are described in 
detail as follows:
3.1.1 Confidentiality
Our scheme ensures the confidentiality by making it 
difficult to compute Prv from other public parameters as it 
involves discrete logarithm computation. 
One significant feature of this scheme is that the certificate 
is generated without explicit involvement of Prv and it uses a 
unique value X, which is computed using Chinese remainder 
theorem. This new concept of our scheme increases the 
complexity to a hacker to obtain the exact private key from the 
certificate.
3.1.2 Authentication 
To forge a public key in our scheme, the intruder has to 
calculate false certificate Cꞌ by substituting false public key 
Pubꞌ in the Eqn. (15) which is computed as
21  * '  ) '  ( *[  *  ] modk PubC f T T q− α β = β  )         
(16)
The false certificate C′ can also be calculated by substituting 
false public key Pub′  from Eqn. (14) and C′  which is written as 
( ) ( )1 1'   *   (  * )   *   (  )*  '  mod  C f f PWD r f f X Pub q− −= α + β  (17) 
It is very difficult to generate the pair (C′ , Pub′), which 
satisfies Eqn. (16) or Eqn. (17) unless the intruder solves 
discrete logarithm. Even though, an intruder is successful in 
guessing the pair (C′ , Pub′ ) to satisfy Eqn. (15) or Eqn. (16), 
it is impossible to satisfy Eqn. (13) with the same Pub′ which 
is used in authentication phase in this scheme. Therefore, an 
intruder cannot get through the authentication phase and hence 
forging of public key is impossible in this scheme.
One more significant feature of this scheme is using two 
equations in the authentication phase to provide the security 
service authentication. The first equation is used to check the 
integrity of the parameters received from the public password 
table and the second equation proves the authenticity of the 
certificate and public key of a user (receiver). 
3.1.3 Non-repudiation
In our scheme, A user signs a certificate C with his/her (Prv, 
Pub) key pair. This certificate C can be verified by anyone using 
the user’s public key Pub. But an ill minded user may deny this 
later, by showing false certificate C′  and corresponding false 
public key Pub′ that satisfy equations in authentication phase. 
However, this is almost impossible in our scheme, because it is 
clear from Eqn.(16) and Eqn.(17) that computation of C′  for a 
chosen Pub′ involves discrete logarithm computation.
3.1.4 Security of the Public Key 
The forgery of public key is possible in Zuhua Shao scheme 
when the server is compromised9. In our scheme, the forgery of 
public key by a compromised server is avoided because of two 
reasons: First is the key server does not provide the public key 
and Second is the key server has no right to generate or send 
certificate to the user. So, if the key server tries to change any 
parameters for false acceptance of public key and sends them 
to sender, this fraud will be detected at verification phase, as 
the modified parameters will fail the access control Eqn. (13) at 
sender’s side. This is because the changed parameters will not 
be compatible with the public key accessed from PKD.
Hence, our scheme can detect the situation whether the 
key server is compromised or not. This is advantageous to 
avoid any security compromises and breach of confidentiality 
due to forged public key.
3.2 Performance Analysis
Performance analysis of Zuhua Shao scheme and proposed 
scheme is discussed as follows:
 
3.2.1 Zuhua Shao Scheme
The time complexity to generate certificate of public key 
of Zuhua Shao scheme is 
O (2 RAND + 8 EXP + 3 HASH+ 1 TRANS)       (18)
where RAND is the time taken to generate one random 
number, EXP is the time to compute one arbitrary exponential 
operation, HASH is time to compute hash of a single input 
using arbitrary hash function h() and TRANS is the sum of 
transmission and propagation delays of sending 4 parameters 
from user to server.
 
3.2.2 Proposed Scheme
The time  complexity to compute certificate in our scheme 
is expressed as 
O ((2*m+1)RAND  +  (m+2)GCD  + 6 EXP)       (19)
where m is the number of iterations performed to select two 
random numbers v1 and v2 such that gcd(v1,v2)=1. The number 
of iterations m are significantly less as the probability10 
Prob[(gcd(v1,v2)=1] is 6/π
2 ≈ 0.6. Hence it can be concluded 
that our scheme takes less number of iterations to converge (for 
selecting two random numbers that are co-prime).
It is observed that, the time complexity of our scheme 
is independent of hashing, transmission and propagation 
delays, compared to Zuhua Shao scheme (because certificate 
is computed by the user itself). And as Prob[(gcd(v1,v2)=1)] ≈ 
0.6, It can be asserted that m will be sufficiently less to make 
the total time taken by this scheme, considerably less than that 
of Zuhua Shao scheme.
Table 1. Comparison of zuhua shao scheme and proposed 
scheme
Parameter Zuhua Shao scheme Proposed scheme
Confidentiality Yes Yes
Non-repudiation Yes Yes
Authentication Yes Yes
Time complexity to 
generate certificate
High moderate
Security of public key No Yes
3.2.3 Summary of Security and Performance Analysis
By the above analysis, it is confirmed that our proposed 
scheme provides all the security services. Also it is simpler 
to implement without a trusted third party and takes less 
computational effort to compute the certificate of user.
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4. CONCLUSION
The paper proposes an improved key authentication 
scheme based on Chinese remainder theorem and discrete 
logarithms. The significant feature of this scheme is, the key 
server is used as a trusted authority only for publishing and 
accessing resources but not as a certificate generator. The 
scheme also allows the user to generate his/her certificate 
without the help of any trusted third party to prevent the 
forgery of public key by a compromised server. Besides this, 
the certificate calculation is done in lesser time comparing 
to the existing schemes. Therefore, our proposed scheme 
demonstrates an improved and trustworthy key authentication 
scheme for public key cryptosystem.
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